Neural plasticity probably made us adapt to and at the same time contributed to the emergence of modern post-Neolithic cultural environments, but the brain could not have undertaken genetic and anatomical modifications during that short lapse of time.
Introduction
Neural plasticity probably made us adapt to and at the same time contributed to the emergence of modern post-Neolithic cultural environments, but the brain could not have undertaken genetic and anatomical modifications during that short lapse of time.
However, brain plasticity was enhanced by modern environments in the sense that typical genetic and basic neurobiological adaptive features selected on a long-term evolutionary generally, refers to the spatial organization of the cortex in response to visual stimuli, which has been observed to form a map of the visual field [3] . Here the topology is simple and the isomorphism may be implemented at di erent neuronal scales. The topology may also be more complex but isomorphism can still be uncovered [3, 4] . Where a cultural cortical map fits is determined by the structure of the stimuli to treat and determines some features of that treatment.
Biases in the neural processing of novel cultural items, when they are attributable to the constraints presiding over an already existing cortical niche, may form the reliable signs that some sort of cultural "exaptation" of that cortical structure has actually taken place. In 
Neural anchoring of material culture
Recent cultural neuroscience [6] That neuronal niche would superimpose over a preexisting cortical map that it would "parasitize" in routinizing that task. Finally, 
Issues in money emergence
Theoretical economics does not assign any role to an intrinsically useless object as fiat money. show that marketability of the object plays an important role in its acceptability as a medium of exchange and in some situations, agents
could not discern these aspects and thus chose suboptimally [13, 14] . It is also observed that an intrinsically worthless at object can circulate as a medium of exchange as long as it has the feature of lowest storage cost; if it is not the least costly to store good, then its circulation as a medium of exchange is more limited than predicted by the theory [15] .
Some recent work in the psychology of money has distinguished between instrumental and hedonic attitude and behavior towards money [16] . It seems that money as a tool -taken essentially as a medium of exchange in view of purchasing desired goods -is conceptually primitive; hedonic qualities of the purported good being derived from acquisition and consumption. However, it has been noticed that money per se possessed hedonic qualities and that it is far from always taken in an instrumental perspective (see [17] ).
An important question in order to study money emergence is whether money was (and still is) 
Low-level money functional processing
If the above hypothesis is correct there should be observable conflicts between value- The ndings in this study show that money was processed at the lower level of reward-related brain activity in the vmPFC.
This suggests that money illusion is deeply
anchored at a biological infra-individual level and that its neural treatment favors value and hedonic features rather than instrumental and more abstract conventional use.
But the fact that money seems to be primarily treated as a reward, and secondarily as a tool, although it indicates the prevalence of low level neural processes, is far from an indication that those neural processes have taken advantage of ancient neural pathways which could optimally functionally extend to that specific processing. Moreover, money is a reward -and is primarily treated as such -to the extent that it acquires some value through a conventional institution. We would need to uncover behavioral and neural evidence that could point to a neural mechanism re ecting this characteristically arbitrary feature of money, namely that conventional features of money are processed outside of rewarding contexts and trade.
In Tallon -Whichever primitive mechanism money processing is rooted in, the fact that a conventionally socially de ned object is treated so automatically, uidly and within circuits and that we will ask the subject to categorize.
We measure response times in those tasks by means of precise chronometric devices. The main prediction is that short response times point toward automatic cognitive processes in categorization or associative (putting two objects together according to some criterion) tasks, which will be interesting to observe whether they are the case in visual settings involving cultural vs. ecological artifacts.
